Ethnic networks-as proxies for information networks-have been associated with higher levels of international trade. Previous research has not differentiated between the roles of these networks on the extensive and intensive margins. The present paper does so using a model with fixed effects, finding that ethnic networks increase trade on the intensive margin but not on the extensive margin.
Introduction
Following Rauch (1999 and 2001) , a literature has developed that looks at the effect of information networks on international trade. To date, empirical research on this question has not distinguished between the extensive margin (whether trade occurs) and intensive margins (the level of trade, given that trade already occurs). Typically, studies pool together observations of zero and positive trade into a single cross-section, thereby treating changes in two positive levels of trade the same as a change between not trading and trading. There is no reason to believe, however, that the effect of information networks on overcoming entry barriers would be the same as on expanding existing trading relationships. One might expect that information barriers are higher in markets in which a country's firms do not already have a presence, and, thus, that an information network would be more helpful on the extensive margin. On the other hand, because information is only one of many entry barriers in overseas markets, an information network might not be a particularly effective advantage in gaining entry into a market. The contribution of this paper is to examine the extensive and intensive margins separately and to show the different effects that information networks have on them.
The empirical application of the information-networks literature has focused on the role of ethnic networks. Because of data availability and comparability, much of the recent work has looked at the relationship between a U.S. state's exports and the state's number of foreign-born residents, finding ethnic-network elasticities ranging between 0.18 and 0.37 [Co, Euzent, and Martin, 2004; Dunlevy, 2006; and Herander and Saavedra, 2005] . All of the studies using U.S. state exports-and nearly all those that use country-to-country trade data-use a standard gravity model with a cross-section of data. As shown by Cheng and Wall (2005) , however, such gravity models tend to be biased because of unobserved or incorrectly specified heterogeneity. In the context of ethnic networks, such bias can arise if there are, say, historical reasons for a high volume of trade between a state and a country as well as for a large number of migrants from the country to the state. It might also be that the measures of distance used in standard gravity models are biased measures of the distance-related costs of trade.
To remedy these problems, Bandyopadhyay, Coughlin, and Wall (2008) constructed a two-year panel of state exports to show that when the estimation controls for country-state fixed effects, the estimate of the ethnic-network elasticity falls by nearly half (from 0.27 to 0.14). This panel approach also allows for an examination of states entering overseas markets to see whether there is a relationship between entry into a market and an increase in the number of the state's residents who were born in that country. We exploit this feature below and use a fixed-effects logit to estimate the extensive margin of ethnic networks and to use OLS with fixed effects to estimate the intensive margin separately. 
Estimation Alternatives
where Y it and N it (i = s,c) are real income and population, respectively. Here, the state-country intercept term α sc controls for all variables that are constant over time and specific to the state and country pair, including distance. We also include a country-specific trend variable, τ c , to control for changes in the level of import protection in each of the export markets. As is commonly (although not necessarily correctly) done to avoid taking the log of zero, we add 1 to every observation for the sake of comparison.
Alternatively, instead of combining the extensive and intensive margins, as in (1), we split the estimation into two parts: (1) the probability of entrance into or exit from a market and (2) the importance of ethnic networks in increasing exports to an already-served market. Our estimation of the extensive margin is which is conditional on there being at least one entry or exit across the 19 industries for a statecountry pair.
2
We estimate the intensive margin with for which x scit is positive for both years. Note that, for consistency with the combined estimation,
we have maintained the convention of adding 1 to every export observation even though we do not have any observations of zero exports. This has a very minor quantitative effect on the ethnic-network elasticity, which would be unchanged to the fifth decimal place if we dropped this convention.
2 We should note the tendency for changes on this margin to be between smaller states and countries, and that these state-country pairs are also less likely to have traded in either period. 
Results
As summarized in Table 1 , estimation of (1) yields an ethnic-network elasticity of 0.192, which is in line with previous estimates. When we split the estimation into equations (2) and (3), however, the ethnic-network elasticity on the extensive margin is not statistically different from zero; but, the elasticity on the intensive margin is a statistically significant 0.139. In other words, we find that ethnic networks are associated with increased exports when a trading relationship already exists, but we find no association between ethnic networks and entry into an export market.
In a Melitz-type model of heterogeneous firms, such as Lawless (2010), a reduction in information costs is more likely to have an effect on the extensive margin, suggesting the opposite of our results. On the other hand, our results make more sense if we also consider exporting and foreign direct investment (FDI) as substitute strategies. 3 Specifically, assume that for every firm a larger ethnic network reduces the cost of becoming an exporter or of engaging in FDI. In such a scenario, some firms (and their states) will become exporters, others will switch from exporting to FDI, while others will switch to FDI from doing neither. On average, therefore, the effect on the intensive margin is ambiguous, although those states that do export will be exporting more.
It is worth pointing out the role that fixed effects have on our results, so we have also estimated (1) -(3) under the assumptions that all state-country pairs have the same non-distancerelated intercept. These estimates include explicitly the distance between the states' and countries' largest cities, along with a dummy to indicate whether the state and country are contiguous. As summarized by Table 2 
